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The following article is an

i edited version of the amicus

1 curiae brief filed with the
1

I

Supreme Court of the United

I States in the October Term,

1998, in the case of Benjamin
Lee Lilly v. Commonwealth of
Virginia (No.98-5881).

"Thiscase raises important
questions about the meaning of
the confrontation clause, which
has been a vital ingredient of
the fair trial right for hundreds
of years,"Professor Richard
Priedman and his co-authors
say. "Inparticular, this case
presents the Court with an
opportunity to reconsider the
relationship between the
confrontation clause and the
law of hearsay."On June 10 the
Court handed down a decision
in favor of Lilly. JusticeStephen

Breyer, a member of the
plurality, wrote a concurring
opinion citing this brief
favorably and suggested that a
future case might call for the
Court to adopt its approach.
(See story on page 53.)

The petitioner, Benjamin Lilly, was
convicted in the Virginia Circuit Court of
the capital murder of a student during a
carjacking. The trial court entered
judgmen~on the jury's verdict on March 7,
1997, and imposed the death sentence
recommended by the jury The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
the sentence on April 17, 1998, in Lilly v.
Cornnzonwenlth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (VA 1998).
With petitioner at the time of the
shooting were Gary Wayne Barker and
petitioner's brother, Mark Lilly At the
petitioner's trial, Barker, who had been
allowed to plead guilty and to avoid the
death penalty, testified against him; Mark
Lilly, who had not been tried or allowed to
plead, invoked his privilege against selfincrimination. The court then admitted the
in-custody confession given by Mark Lilly
to the police in which he named his
brother as the triggerman. Mark Lilly was
subsequently permitted to plead guilty to
noncapital murder, and recanted portions
of his confession at petitioner's sentencing.
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court
held that Mark Lilly's in-custody confession
had been properly admitted as a statement
against interest under a "firmly rooted"
Virginia hearsay exception, and that the
confession therefore satisfied the
confrontation clause.
This case presents the Court with an
opportunity to restore the confrontation
clause to its proper place as one of the
fundamental guarantees protected by the
Constitution, one with deep roots in the
Anglo-American tradition, and indeed,
throughout Western jurisprudence.
Decisions of this Court have tended to
merge the confrontation right with the
ordinary law of hearsay, perceiving both as
principally guarantors of the reliability of
evidence.
This approach, we submit, has not
worlted. It denigrates the confrontation
right and the fundamental sense of
procedural fairness that the right protects.
It ignores the language of the clause, the
history of the right, and the role of the
right in the Sixth Amendment. It provides
insufficient guidance and affords too much
discretion to lower courts in interpreting
the confrontation clause. It simultaneously
leads to overly rigid hearsay lam7 The price
to our system of justice is exemplified by
intolerable results such as the one reached
by the court below in this case.
We believe that it is necessary to break
the link between confrontation and hearsay,
both so that s rob us^ understanding ol the
confrontatior! right can be developed and

so that ordinary hearsay law will not be
confused by an imposed correspondence
with a right that has been inadequately
articulated. A majority of this Court, in
M ~ i t v.
e Illinois, 502 U.S.
346,353 (1992),
rejected a proposal by the government to
uncouple the confrontation clause from the
hearsay rule as an "argument . . . [that]
comes too late in the day," but that
conclusion was apparently based primarily
on the Court's concern that the
government's reading of the clause "would
virtually eliminate its role in restricting the
admission of hearsay testimony"
By contrast, the approach we present
here would reinvigorate the clause, giving
it force independent of hearsay law At the
same time, though our approach is
markedly different analytically from the
current doctrine, the results of our
approach would, at least for the most
part, square with those reached in the
Court's decisions.
The most crucial step in achieving a
better sense of tlze confrontation clause is
recognizing its unique purpose. The Sixth
Amendment provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with witnesses
against h m . " The concerns that led to the
confrontation clause predate modem
hearsay law. Two consequences flow from
this acknowledgement. First, if a declarant
is acting as a witness - whether in or out
of court - the clause undeniably applies
and violations of its core principles cannot
be excused on the basis of hearsay
exceptions. Second, not every hearsay
declaration raises a confrontation clause
issue. Within its proper realm, we believe
the confrontation clause states a simple and
categorical rule, which is central to the
Anglo-American concept of justice: the
accused has a light to confront all adverse
witnesses. This means, at the very least,
the right to cross-examine the witness
under oath.
We will present in this brief some
varying understandings of what the term
"witnesses" should be understood to mean
in the clause. Formulating a precise
definition is not a simple matter, but under
any plausible definition, Mark Lilly was
acting as a witness within the meaning of
the clause when he made the crucial
accusation in this case. The admission of
such statements sets up, in elcect, an
inquisitorial system in which prosecutors
are free to take unsworn statements from

witnesses behind closed doors, out of the

presence of the accused or of counsel, who
are given no opportunity for crossexaminaton, and tihen use those statexrients
to convict a dekndkt -d because of ' h e
courts' perception that su* testimony is
trusrworthy This practice was recognized
to be unacceptable long before the
confrontation clause was adopted. And it is
at the very qpre of what the clause was
meant to prevent. Just as the rights to trial by jury andito counsel are not qualified by
the courtk evaluation of the merits of the
case, the right to confront the witness $
not quahfied by the court? evaluation of
the accuracy nf the witness' statement.

@,-&?
described as an&-&a
be
accuihg witness and the ecms - $.
~ e g h h nm
g ~ l rycentpry bche S~&;;F
wrote, mb con+uing kor centuries
afterward^, numerow ~agl~djuciges (
comrnentatora praised the upen d
';
confrontationalmark of the En*
trial
in contrast to itsr04tinentd count:qiwt, c
Foracample, Sir Matthew ~ d l huded
e
!
;
the " o h Course of E~depce.tuthe Jury
in the h e n c e of pe~ u d bJq
, Plrticq and Council" in Eriglish procedum. h o K g
other advan@es,&is procedure allowed - '
*Opportunity for all Persons concern'd" to
question the wimess and "oP$o~tunityof confronting the adverse Witnesses." In a
passage closely following Hale, Blaekstom
articulated many of the same advantag& including "the confronting of adyerse
witn&esn -of "the-Engkh way of giving!
I
testimony, on1
tm."
Thus, by 1696, in the celeb ted ase of
R. v. Paine, it was clearly estaplis ed &Bt*
even if a witness had died,'his statement
k d e to a ' j u d e of the peace could not be,
admitted against a misdemeanor defendant'
because the defendant was not present i l l
when the examination was taken and so
"could not axs-examine" the deponent.
To be syre, the norm of confrontation
was not always respe'cted.8First, Paint itself
distinguished felony cases. Since *e mid16th century,justices of the peace had
been required to examine felony witnesses,
h d these examinations were admissible at;
trial if the witness was then unavailable
and the examination was taken under oath;
This anomalously lenient treatment '
which was probably one of the aKuses at
which the confrontation clause was aimed --was controversial by the early 17th
century, and it was eliminated by stature iii
the 19th century
Second, a set of courts in England,
including the equity courts, followed the i
continental system rather than the
common law, relying largely on'testbynyi
taken out of court and,out of the presence!
of the parties. These courts appeared to be '
arms of unlimited royal power, and so
many of them, notably thecourt of Star '
Chamber, did not survive ihe upheavals of
the 17th century
f i r d , the crown, eager to use the
criminal law as a means of contr01hg its :
adversaries, sometimes used testimony-.

h
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Anglo-American traditions, civilized
practice, and the structure of the Smth
knendment call for a categorical right to
confrontation independenLof the hearsay
doctrine. The right of an accused to
, confront the witnesses against him
S S and is hdepedent of, the law of
8 a ~el's0Il aS a ~ I ~ M ~predates,
hearsay It has received its fullest
against an accused'the accused development w i b the Anglo-American
must have an 0pp0-V
to tradition, but it has also been a critical
m&nt that person feature of other judicial systems, which
have n o k g resembhg our law of
hearsay The history and broad recognitionof the confrontation right demonstrate that
it is not an adjunct of, or an attempt to
constitutio&e, the law of hear* Rather,
it is a fundamental and ~ate~orical~rule
as
to how the testimony of wiGesses should
be taken.
The right to confrontation has a long
history that antedates the hearsay rule. The
ancient Hebrews required accusing
witnesses to give their testimony in front of
the accused. So did the Romans. When
medieval continental systems began to rely
on the testimony of witnesses, they allowed
the parties to examine the witnesses -but
on written questions. These systems took
the testimony behind closed doors, for fear
that witnesses would be coached or
intimidated.
By contrast, the open and
confrontational way in which teshony
was taken was the mast critical
characteristic of the common law trial. In
the middle of the 16th century, Sir Thomas
Smith wrote a well-known account of a
typical English crimBal trial, which he

...
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taken out of the presence of the accused.
Thus, it is in the treason cases of Tudor and
Stuart England thal we find the battle for
the confrontation right most clearly fought.
As early as 1521, treason defendants,
often using the term "face to face,"
demanded hat the witnesses be brought
before them. Sometimes these demands
were heeded, sometimes not - but what is
most notable is that they found recurrent
support in acls of Parliament, which
repeatedly required that accusing witnesses
be brought "face to face" with (he
defendanl. By the middle of the 17th
century, the battle was won, and courts
clearly understood that treason witnesses
must testify before the accused, subject to
questions by the accused.
Well into that century, prosecutorial
authorities often tried to use confessions of
alleged accomplices of the accused that
were not made according to the usual
norms of testimony, under oath and before
the accused. The case of Sir Walter Raleigh
is the most notorious, but far from the only
one. The theory - remarkably similar to
the one adopted by the lower court in this
case - was that self-accusation was "as
strong as if upon oath." But the judges
soon realized the iniquity of allowing an
exception to the usual noims of testimony
simply because the accomplice accused
himself as well as another.
In 1662, shortly after the Restoration,
the judges of the King's Bench ruled
unaninlously and definitively that, though
a pretrial confession was "evidence against
the Party himself who made the
Confession" and, if adequately proved,
could indeed support conviction of that
person without witnesses to the reason
itself, the confession "cannot be used as
evidence against any others whom on his
Examination he confessed to be in the
Treason." This fundamental piinciple seems
never since to have been seriously
challenged until recently - in cases like
the current one.
The conlrontation right naturally round
its way to America. Thus, a Massaclzusetts
statute of 1647 provided that "in all capital
cases all witnesses shall be present
wheresoever they dwell." But the
Americans did not simply draw on English
law. American criminal procedure
developed in a distinctive way The right to
counsel in felony trials developed far more
quickly in America than in England, and
with it rose an adversarial spirit that made
the opportunity for confrontation of
~dversewitnesses especially crucial. In

addition, the right became especially
relevant to American concerns when
Parliament began in the 1760s to regulate
the colonists through inquisitorial means
like the Stamp Act, which provided for the
examination of witnesses upon
interrogatories. It is clear that the framers
were aware of the abuses in the 16th and
17th century treason trials of the
defendants' demands for meeting their
accusers "face to face." They knew as well
about the procedural reforms achieved by
the Glorious Revolution, which included
requiring treason to be proved through the
testimony of two trial witnesses.
In the Revolutionary period, the right to
confrontation was frequently expressed,
especially in the early state constitutions.
Some used the time-honored "face to face"
phrase; others, following Hale and
Blackstone, adopted language strikingly
similar to that later used in the
confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
Note that in this account of the
background of the Confrontation Clause,
we have not mentioned reliability To be
sure, one of the advantages perceived by
those who lauded the common law system
of open confi-ontationof witnesses was its
coiztribution to truth-determination. But
neither in the statutes, nor in the case law,
nor in the commentary was there a
suggestion that, if the courts determined
that a particular item or type of testimony
was reliable, then the accused lost his right
of confrontation. On the contrav, the
confrontation principle was a categorical
rule, a basic matter of the procedures by
which testimony was taken.
Similarly the law against hearsay has
not played a role in this account. It could
not have: Hearsay doctrine, like evidentiary
law more generallj<was not well developed
even at the time the clause was adopted,
nzuch less duling the previous centuries
As late as 1794, Edmund Burlze remai-ked
in the House of Commons that the rules of
"the law of evidence . . . [were] very
general, very abstract, and comprised in so
small a compass that a parrot he had
knotvn might get them by rote in one half

hour, and repeat them in live minutes."
The tendency lo meld the confrontaiion
right and hearsay is a h e r - d a y
development. It lilzely reflects tlze influence
of Wigmore, who subordinated the
confrontation iight to hearsay More recent
commentators regard Wigmore's view as
anachronistic because their research
teaches that the hearsay rule evolved in
both England and America considerably
later than Wigmore argued.
It is noteworthy that the word hearsay
appears neither in Mattox I! United States
156 U.S. 237 (1895), the first of several
cases to note that the "piimary object" of
the clause was to prevent the use of
testimony taken e x parte, nor in Poiniel- v.
Texas 380 U.S.
400 (1965), which held
that the clause expresses a fundanlental
right applicable against [he states. As its
language plainly indicates, the clause mias
not an attempt to constitutionalize the
nasceizt law of hearsay Rather, it plainly
expressed the fundamental principle that if
a person acts as a witness against an
accused, the accused must have an
opportunity to confront that person.
Our historical discussion has s h o ~ m
that evidentiary concerns were not a
significant factor in adoption of the
confrontaiion clause. Rather, the clause was
meant to protect a categorical procedural
light that, like the iight to counsel, Taras in
place by the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted. The conclusion is fortified by the
placement of the clause in the Sixth
Amendment.
If one looks at the grand design of tlze
SLxh Amendment, in accordance w ~ t h
01-dinaiy canons of statutory analysis that
constIue a provision as a hai~nonious
whole, one sees a bundle of procedural
protections for a criminal defendant that
have more than accuracy in factlinding at
their core. The light to counsel is
recognized as fundamental even il it
interferes wit11 factfinding in a particular
case. And the light to a jury trial is not
suspended because a judge may be more
capable than jurors of correctly evaluating
complicated expert tesr-imon)~,
such as
conzpeting statistical analyses of the
significance of DNA elitdence. Nor has the
interprelation of the Con~pulsorjrProcess
Clause turned solely on "accuracy ill
factfinding."

m y the Gxhntation &use has of
late been stripped of pr/
0 t h lhrn
~
furthmng evidentiq objectives. We UI&
thccauttom~thptdljs
b t n r p ~ t a t i ~ignores
n
sigdhnt values at
the axe of the nght to admaation, anand
leads to intolerabe results that m o t be
adequatelypoliced by the &ut.
pexspectiw is borne out bg merit
developmentsunder the European
Convention on H u m Rights. This
convention c o n e n o w - b b
a
b
y rule. of COU~SC,
bemuse most of the
judicial systems fdhg under it do not
have hearsay law. Bur Articles 6(1) and
6(3)(d) of the convention contain,
-vel3r,
a gened protection of a '
a h i d d e f h t ' s @t to a fair trialand
a specific pmtection of his right Zo
examine OT h e examined witnesses
S@IW him." Under thse pmvisions, the
European Court of H u m Rights has
m e d a seda of decisions
right of confrontation, which it hss ref&
to as such.
Thus,the Court has repeatedly held that
defendants' confrontation rights were
violated by the use at trial of statements
made before trial to investigative or
proseatorial authorities, where the
defimcht had no opportunity to examine
the witness. And the E n g M Court of
Appeal has recently &d on the same
provisions of the convention in r e a m a
similar condusion.

We thus face the great irony that the
confrontation @t, one of the great glories
of t& Anglo-American system of criminal
procedu~,is now receiving its clearest
a2ticulation in decisions by and following a
continental court. The reasons are clear
enough: The Emare unencumbered
by the p e c u h hearsay docnine of the
mm
isw mdtiOnn
They recognize that
corhntation is a categorical rule that
expa fundamental human right.

~nsemh

-ontiethe~w-hwi
a

&--a

U.S.530 ( l 9 ~ 3 ,

of more cons~1tresults
state& " b e d maf the hmrmy
inva1wd . . as a qimple 'dqWm

.

- -1s:

A caregoriaal right of cod'mnpa,tion
h t ~ &?x&wmg
~ " ' that
would yield m o oonstsnt.ne~ults,
~
t d b wo kqgz a d a s - f a
eliminate the courts' need to evaluate
ccmhnion d n v s e d p % i . . ~
t n x s t w ~ ~ine applying
s~
the
Gnq~ntly ~
~
not : $1..;
Amad'mpt, and p e d t tire cmtin~ing
aut~1mWy
adrhjssble ns
moaP!
ded0p-t
of the h m rule
~ withut
even through thc ~edersl~ules,and
x:
~quiringthe o v e m b of prior P - ~ B
; numebus state codifimtiom, had
T ,
of the Court. The Gurt's a n e n t approach q m & d the hamy mce~tiaq
pi
to confrontation produds ,iqtolerble
declarations a
interest to encow&
results, as illustrated & the case below.
statements against penal
I
The court has declared an q c t fit
V i e d together, White.
h e lad to ,-.
between the hearsay rule and the
citruliar masoning. White indietes that s
confrontation &we when the out-ofkourt when a state p M ) ka s m e n t t
hfits , g
statement
a "findly
h a A y within pn exception that is "firmlyrooted" -,
exception. (The court has said that "a
-i.e., widely accepted by th stat9 for ?
%ndy rooted' hearsay exception is so
.I
t
eddhl
some time, and p ~ s e nin
~
~ that dversarial
o
testing
~
bey Rules -rmstw0rthi.n~'canbe inferred.
expected to add little to its reliabilityn)
I
' Tkus,th$ need-forconfrontation
This f o m h , which masquerade as a
disappeas -even if the exception was
~ategoriicalrule that results in consistent
m d e d by the rules themselves beyond ;
interpretations of a b e constitutional
prier law and -if
the particular
. 1
W t , instead @ves lower ~ u h ~s O ~ O U Sapplication is poorly grounded in the
1:
leeway to
beam)' a&awta ~~1
rationale o
m exception. Lee says that m
defendant, subject to correction only in the inherently u n t m ~ o r t h ystatement camm
rare instance in which this Court %rants
n
be automwJly admitted aj
cerEioruri
rootedneven if the exception under which,:
The test to be used:in determining
it is offered
been genemny accepted hr
when an exception is "fhdy rooted" is far
a while, and is h c o p m k d in h e F e w
from clear. In White (502 U.S.at 357),
Rules. Taken together, these ~ a s e sbeg the
the Court dfimed the Illinois courts question of how a court should sspond
~ d m o ofn statemmade in the
when reviewing evidence proffwd under $
of receivingmedical care that idenufied the refash*
traditioml c k d p t i o n , m4
defendant as having sexually a b ~ adfour- nontraditional c k exception, that has
year-old child. The Court justified its
been accepted for some peIjod of time in
~ ~ d ~that
i such
o nstatements "firmly its jurisdiction and c~thm.
rooted by noting-thata hearsay exception
The default test of particularized
for such statements is recogmad in the
guarantees of trustworthin&ss,"which
Federal Rules of Evidence, and is Wdely
a p p b when a exception is not fumy
accepted among the states." But before the
rooted, also fa& to offermficim gui&nae
Federal Rules' enactment in 1975, the
or to prorect a defendant adequately,asthis
'
exception generally &d mt include
I case illustrates. Nothing in the actual
statements such as the one involved in
ho1dm.g of Lke barsa court from admitting
White, describing inju* muse, even if an accomplice'sconfession,such as the
relevant to dqposis or treatment
s t a k m t in this case, if it comludes that
Moreover, numemus post-White c~urts , the p a r t i a h confession is sufficiently
have admitted statements under c m r of
=liable. So long as thc Court.retains w
ic
the exception a+ over confrontation
t r u s w o view
~ of confrontation, and,
clause objections even though the
does not abandon Lee in favor of a per sc
uustwomtionale of the m p t i o n
rule that certain kinds of conf"om-pevei
was not satisfled because the declarant was
I
too young to appreciate that 'the efEcacy of
her metreatment depends upon the
accuracy of the i n f o m o n provided to
the doctor."
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&hec-btiisn
c b , coum will
ha*
ellamus,
vjrtlxllly
fzaEltb"i\m
u-bJ.e,
discretion in detm~jv~*m on a case-by-case b&.
The Eacts of this case demonstrate the
amrphoua nature of a tr~1~~0rthhe.s
inquiry Tme,Mark Uly admitted to
pmr&ipslrion in a series of crimes. Bur the
"ro&
of cimmstanccs that surround the
miking of the statement" (see Idaho v.
Wrght, W7 U.S. 805,820 [1990]),raises
npmemus fictors -whch ,weassume
petiiioner will present to this Court - that
mght phusibly account for Mark LiUy
falsely incriminating his brother.
It cannot be fair to deprive a defendant
of Ehe ancient right to face his accuser
because a judge mixes some dubious
generahations about human behavior such as that one is unlikely to make a
statement confessing a crime unless the
entirety of the statement is substantidy
true, or that brothers would not falsely
incriminate each other -with h~ own
view of the surrounding facts to conclude
that the statement is probably true. Hearsay
excepti~nsmay hinge on such cliches, but
a defkdant should have the right to
challenge h~ accuser in the courtroom
when the out-of-court statement falls
within the perimeter of core values on
which the Srxth Amendment right of
confrontation rests.

Law of confrontation
independent of the
law of hearsay
Neither the "firmly rootedntest nor the
requirement of "particularized guarantees
of trustworthinessnprovides a satisfactory
test of confrontation that guides the lower
courts or ensures that a defendant is
accorded the procedural protections
guaranteed by thdisixth Amendment.
A categorical approach would exclude
in-custody confessions unless the
defendant was afforded his light-of
confrontation. Our arguments inhcate that
the constitutionalri& of confrontation is
independent of, and should not be made
subonbate to, the ordinary law of hearsay
We contend that applicability of the
confrontation clause to an out-of-court
f

statement doemc.~depend on a murtb
~SRSSU
I ZX
I
of the ~ ~ t e m ~~gliabiliy
m's
Rather8the c k stam a fundamental
procddural protection, and applies
categorically to certain type of statements.
In this section, we will present two
propopals for defining h t category of
statements. W e we urge the Court to
declare that such a mgorica1 right exists,
we do-not believe that to decide this case
the Court must choose one of tkse
variants, or any other pafticular proposal,
or that it must define the boundaries of the
clause with pnxkion. Under any reasonable
demarcation of the category of statements
covered by h e clause, accomplice
confessions like the one here of Mark LiUy
he at the heart of the clause, and nowhere
near the edge.
A tedmmhl view. Under one approach,
the key question is this:In making the
statement at issue, should the declarant be
deemed to have been as a witness within
the meaning of the confrontation clause?
If not, then under this approach the clause
does not apply. On the other hand, if the
declarant was acting as a witness, and the
accused has not had an adequate
opportunity to confront her, then the
statement may not be admitted against the
accused (unless he has forfeited the
conbntatim right by causing the witness's
unavabbdity). See Akhil Reed Amar, The
Constiiution and Crimid Pmedune 125-31
(1997) and Richard D. Friedman,
"Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles," 86 Georgetown Law Jatfrnal
1011, 1022-26 (1998).
rhlsview finds obvioik support in the
language of the confrontation clause whlch speaks in unqualified terms of the
accused's right to confront "the witnesses
againstnthe accused. It is supported also by
the history of the clause and in its manifest
role in our system of uiminal procedure.
As we have shown, the clause
constitutionalizes a long-established
procedural rule governing the manner by
which witnesses give testimony for
adjudication in the Anglo-American
system, a manner far different Erom the
inquisitod style used by Continental
courts.
When, then, should a declarmt be
deemed to have acted as a witness in
maa statement against an accused?

So long as the Court retains its

trusw~ahin~viavof
confrontation, and does not
abandon Laein fam ofa
rule that certainkindsd
confessions never sabisfytbe
confrontation clause, courtswill
continueto haveemmm,
virtually unmdewablle, discretion
in determining trustwo&e58
1

Put another way, when is her statement
testimonial? Obviously she acts as a
witness if she testified in court, at the trial
of the defendant; the defendant then has a
right to be present at the trial and crossexamine her. It is hardly less obvious that
the declarant is acting as a witness if she
gives the prosecution an affidavit, or
otlienvlse makes a formal pre-trial
statement under oath about the alleged
crime to the authorities. (Statements made
at a grand jury proceeding, therefore,
should not be usable at tiial unless the
declarant testifies and is subject to crossexamination. This rule would eliminate the
current practice of subjecting grand jury
statements to a "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness" analysis when they are
offered under a residual hearsay exception.)
Indeed, it has often been sald that e x parte
affidavits and other "formalized testimonial
materials" were the focus of the
confrontation clause.
Justices Scalia and Thomas explicitly
included "confessions" in the category of
"fonnalized testimonial materials." Thus,
their analysis would - properly - bring
statements like Mark Lilly's in this case
within the ambit of the confrontation
clause. A better and less strained approach
to the same result, we suggest, is to
recognize that formality is not a
prerequisite to deeming a statement
testimonial, and so bringing it witlzin that
ambit. Rather, formality is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for making
testimony acceptable. In particular, the oath
is perhaps the oldest and most nearly
universal requirement for the giving of
testimony If unsworn confessions to the
authorities were not deemed to be
statements within the protection of the
confrontation clause, then we would have
a system in which the authorities could
take statements for use at Lrial, made by
declarants knowing they would be so used
- testimony in any real sense of the word
- absent not only confrontalion but also
he basic protection of the oath; indeed, the
authorities would have an incentive to take
the statement without the oath, simply so
that the confrontalion clause could not be
invoked. Thus, it appears that statements
made knowingly, even informally, LO the
authorities investigating a crime should be
considered testimonial and so within the
coverage of he confrontation clause.
In short, under the testimonial approach,
this is an easy case. Ivlark Lilly's custodial
confession lies aL the core of he
confrontation case, not near its fringes.
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A prosecutorial restraint view. A
somewhat different focus rephrases the key
question to ask whether tlze govellm~en[
participated in making the declarant a
witness against the defendant. This
approach views the confrontation clause as
integral to a central objective of the Bill of
Fhghts - to restrain the capricious use of
governmental power. The colonists were
well aware that the criminal law is a
powerful tool in controlling perceived
enemies of the state, and knew of the
potency and secrecy with which a
government can act. To counter these
dangers, out-of-court statements procured
by the prosecution or police, or their
agents, should stand on a different footing
than statements obtained without
governmental intrusion. Requiring
confrontation when the prosecution has
played a part in producing the evidence
enables the public to scrutinize the process
by which the government is exercising its
power, and complements the other rights
that the Sixth Amendment grants - trial
by jury, a public trial, specification of the
charges, and right to counsel.
Under this approach, confrontation
protects the defendant against statements
that the government might elicit through
its enormous power to coerce or induce. If
confrontation is not required, the
government has the huge advantage of
choosing whether to offer the contents of
the statement through the testimony of the
often discreditable declarant, or through
the testiinony of a presumptively upright
person involved in law enforcement
(assuming a hearsay exception otherwise
applies).
There may be instances in which the
prosecutorial restraint model might yleld a
different result than the testimonial
approach. But this is not such a case. Mark
Lilly's in-custody statement to the police
falls squarely within the ambit of the
confrontation right a prosecutorial restraint
approach would grant.
A ca~egoricalapproach is consistent
with the results reached by the Court in its
prior decisions. Plainly, the approach to the
confrontation clause that we suggest and
the doctrine enunciated by the Court are
difierent analytically Our approach is,
however, consistent with all, or virlually
all, of the restilk reached by the Court.
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Indeed, we believe that, though the Cour~
has not consciously articulated our
approach, its decisions have reflected the
force of that approach. We do no1 contend,
of course, that adoption of our approach
will answer all questions under the
confrontation clause or that il will
eliminate all difficult cases. But some cases
that have appeared troublesome to the
Court become vely straightfonvard under
our approach.
First consider Pointer Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965), the case that first established
that the confrontation right is a
fundamental one incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment, its companion
Douglas v Alabainn, 380 U.S. 415 (1965),
and Lee v Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
These cases all had two features. First, in
each of these cases, the declaration at issue
was a statement knowingly made in a
judicial proceeding or to investigative
authorities, providing information material
to a criminal investigation. Thus, under
any variation of the approach we have
presented, the declarants must be deemed
to have been witnesses within the meaning
of the confrontation clause. Indeed, in both
Do~iglnsand Lee, as in this case, the
declaration was the confession of an alleged
accomplice. Second, in these cases the
accused did not have an adequate
opportunity to confront the witness. Thus,
in each of these three cases the conclusion
is easy that the accused's confrontation
rights were violated - without any need
for anything like the dubious reliability
analysis of Lee.
By contrast, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970), and United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986), the first of these features
was not present, so statements appear not
LO have been wi~hinthe realm of the
confrontation clause as we have defined it.
In Dutton, the statement was made by one
piisoner to another. In Inadi, the statements
were made by one member of a conspiracy
to another, without any inducelnent by
agents of the prosecution; they were not
testifying but carrylng on the ordinary
business of the conspiracy Thus, in neither
of these cases were the declarants acting as
witnesses when they made the statements
in issue. A similar argument has force with
respecl to at least some ol the statements
made by the four-year-old declarant such as those to her babysitter and to her
mother - in Wlzite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346
(1992).
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-clechratim against intenzit hi general

md neither the Courtb dedsicm nor the
rule aves any basis for declining to do so
-it limits the u s e m sf a much-used
exception acrofs a broad range of cases,
civil as well as criminal; the interpretation
in
was far more restrictive b n
most prior authorities suggested.
W~Uiamonis lhus a good indication that
the melding of the confrontation clause
and of hearsay doctrine thds not only to
denigrate the constitutional protection, but
also to make hearsay law unduly rigid.
The Court will,we believe, continue to
make deckbns that reflect the demands of
the confrontation right, becaw that right
is such a fundamental, and intuitively
jurisprudence.
appealing, aspect of d-d
But if it continues to use heamy law as the
vehicle for those decisions, it will be
unable to articulate either a robust
understanding of the constitutional right or
a sensible, truth-oriented, doctrine of
hearsay

& m & ~h~ el twigless befarre trial. That was
se in,MamY, United States, 156 U.S.237
(18!?5), QXI tof the oldest cmfkntation
which the witness had
ect to ccrose-examination,at
auwed:5 &st trial but died before his
d#t&x'lAnd
. in Calfjomia v. Green, 399
U6,149(1970), the accuse$ had an
qppomnity at a prelunary hearing to
examine the witness, who appeared at trial
but was then uncooperative.
In Nattejr, the pseeution could not
have produced the witness at the trial in
question, and in Gr-em the prosecution did
pmduee him. In other cases, though the
accused had some previous opportunity to
examine the witness, hestill raised a
confkntatian clause argument that the
prosecution had not done what it could to
secure the live testimony of the witness at
the trial & question. In Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968), the Court agreed that the
prosecpion had failed to make a good faith .
attempt to secure the attendance of the
witness at trial; in addition, it held that in
the cimmstances the defendants prior
opportunity to examine the witness had
not been sufficient. Plainly, the holdmg of
Barber is not inconsistent with our
I ;
approach. Even assuming @e defendant
The Court ,couldreach the proper result
had a previous oppodty
to confront in this
without revisiting ie appmach
the witness, it is still preferabl'e that the
to the confrontation clause. But to do so
witness testify live, and the prose~tion
would just be ta put one more patch on a
O"*t
make
to secure
tattered garment. It would,leave lower
his attendance. In Mancusi u Slubbs, 408
coum
on how to apply the
204 (19721, and Ohio V. bbe*, 448
because there would still be no
u.s- 56 (lg80), the
that the
constant guide to the Cows decisions. It
pros&utionS efforts were satisfactory:
would continue to make effective appellate
Again, nothing in these cases is
review impractical, because decisions
inconsistent with our approach: Given that
would still depend so heady on
of
the accused had previously had an
the evidence in the particular case. It
adequate opportunity to examine the
would require continuing reliance on
witness,if the witness was unavadable at
hearsay doctrine to do the work that
trial despite good faith efforts, the
should be performed by the confrontation
confrontation clause should not preclude
ch
-to the detriment of both. It
use of the earlier testimony
would mean that the CourtS stated
Finally, we note Williamson u United
of decision lack persuzive power.
States, 512 U.S.594 (1994). A
And it would miss out on the great
straightforward result would have
principle underlying the clause, one
cognized that admission of the statement
intepl to the
Amendment and with
at issue, an accomplicek confession to the
robt, both deep snd broad:
the
police, presumptively violated the
government prosecutes an accused, the
confrontation clause1Instead, the Court
accused has a
right to codmnt
hued a highly restrictive construction of
"the witnesses against him."
the hearsay exception for declarations
The decision of the Virginia Supreme
agSlbt penal intemt, e ~ p m in
d Federal
Court should be
Rule af Evidence 804(b)(3). The basis for
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